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THE FREE-TRADE DOCTRINE AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY OF CONDY RAGUET

Stephen Meardon
Department of Economics, Bowdoin College
May 11, 2011

ABSTRACT
Condy Raguet (1784-1842) was the first Chargé d’Affaires from the United States to Brazil and
a conspicuous author of political economy from the 1820s to the early 1840s. He contributed to
the era’s free-trade doctrine as editor of influential periodicals, most notably The Banner of the
Constitution. Before leading the free-trade cause, however, he was poised to negotiate a
reciprocity treaty between the United States and Brazil, acting under the authority of Secretary of
State and protectionist apostle Henry Clay. Raguet’s career and ideas provide a window into the
uncertain relationship of reciprocity to the cause of free trade.

INTRODUCTION
On the third of January, 1829, a new newspaper began publication in Philadelphia. Its editor,
Condy Raguet, expected it to rival Hezekiah Niles’s digest of political news and congressional
and executive proceedings, Niles’ Weekly Register. Niles was a thorough chronicler, but he was
also a biased one: he stood with Mathew Carey and Henry Clay in the first rank of advocates of
the protective tariff. The “Tariff of Abominations” of 1828 demonstrated the need for a
competitor – one who could answer Niles and his ilk with sophisticated free-trade arguments
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informed by the science of political economy. Raguet was the man, and The Free Trade
Advocate and Journal of Political Economy was his vehicle.
Raguet combated protectionist arguments with energy, skill, and command of empirical
facts. The last quality was essential, as the opposition of his theory to the facts was a charge he
often had to answer. “The friends of the monopoly or restrictive system, are always calling out
for facts,” he observed. They wished to know, for example, when a merchant sent word from Rio
de Janeiro of American coarse cottons being in great demand at a good price, was not the free
traders’ beautiful theory refuted? The theory held that the United States’ advantages lay in
agriculture and commerce. Did not the salability in foreign markets of U.S. manufactures,
fostered by protection at home, signal the superiority of the protectionist doctrine?1
Raguet was uniquely suited to answer. He was a man of practical experience: he had just
returned from serving as the first U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Brazil. His counterargument was
built carefully on evidence, and, to those who were not already fixed in opposition, might have
been persuasive. But it did not put to rest the purported dichotomy of free-trade theory and fact.
He felt obliged to refute it for the rest of his life.
His refutation was complicated by one source of tension between theory and fact that
Raguet, as a diplomat as well as a free trader, knew well. Free trade promoted the advancement
of national industry, construed broadly, and wellbeing. So held the theory. But the fact was that
completely free trade, as Raguet understood it, could only be achieved by two methods. One was
a combination of diplomacy and tariff legislation that coaxed or coerced trade partners to relax
their trade barriers as the United States relaxed its own. The other was to await an extraordinary
coincidence: the United States and its partners deciding to relax their barriers independently.
Failing both methods, the free-trade vision could be fulfilled only partly at best.
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From that discouraging fact two others followed. First, partial fulfillment of the free-trade
vision, by foregoing the material benefits for some of the potential beneficiaries, could be
politically untenable. Second, if free traders tried to achieve the vision through diplomacy and
coercive tariff legislation, then they risked appearing to accept, or even coming to accept, a
notion that was antithetical to their theory. It was the notion that one country’s reductions of
trade barriers were in the nature of concessions. As concessions, they were prejudicial to the
country’s interests. They were granted only in exchange for compensating reciprocal
concessions.
The dilemma was the same one that proponents of trade liberalization face today.2 Raguet
is interesting in light of the peculiar circumstances in which he faced it. During his mission in
Brazil he was instructed to negotiate a treaty of commercial reciprocity with the Emperor’s
ministers. His instructions came from Henry Clay, who was then Secretary of State – and who
also happened to be the chief political architect of the protectionist doctrine. A tantalizing
opportunity for trade expansion could only be seized, it would have seemed, by accommodating
protectionism and compromising free trade. What was a free trader to do?
The scant historical literature on Raguet does not take up the question. The most
complete biographical essay written by authors personally acquainted with him, a work of
twenty-five pages by Clement C. Biddle and Richard DeCharms, is valuable for its firsthand
treatment of his familial relations, religious convictions, and professional activities. But of these
aspects of his life, and even more of the intellectual and political problems that concerned him,
the essay is no more than it professes to be: a “sketch.” Only three works on Raguet of greater
length have ever been produced. One, a dated M.A. thesis in Political Science from Columbia
University, is a fair survey of several of his political views and economic ideas but makes no
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reference to his sustained interest and changing opinions in the matter of commercial reciprocity.
The same is true of a recent Ph.D. dissertation in History from the University of South Carolina,
which has the added virtue of delving into more and useful detail about Raguet’s affiliations with
the causes of state rights and hard money. Finally, a Ph.D. dissertation in Education by a
Brazilian scholar at the University of Pennsylvania gives an extraordinarily descriptive picture of
Raguet’s ancestry, where he lived, what he studied, and whom he knew. It is indispensible for
examining his political economy in a detailed historical setting. But that is not its author’s
purpose. Her peculiar interest is in what she calls Raguet’s “multicultural competence” and
“autodidacticism.”3
Until now, the published works on Raguet since Biddle and DeCharms’s sketch were
limited mainly to several paragraphs, one large part of a chapter, and two journal articles by
Joseph Dorfman, Paul Conkin, and Thomas L. Martin. They offer useful reflections on Raguet’s
career and his ideas on banking and international trade. None, however, is concerned with the
particular combination of tasks that contributed to the formation and evolution of his trade
doctrine. A book about the Philadelphia Free Trade Convention of 1831 by W. Stephen Belko
adds important new information to the stock of knowledge about Raguet, who was foremost
among the convention’s organizers. This essay draws upon Belko’s treatment of the convention
but, on the whole, covers different ground.4
That ground may be surveyed briefly. Condy Raguet was a leading contributor to freetrade doctrine in the United States. At one time he was also in an uncommon position of
responsibility to translate the doctrine into policy. But the policy at issue, reciprocity, had an
uncertain place in the doctrine: it was proposed by protectionists, too. Raguet had to negotiate

5
theoretically the dilemma of unilateralism versus reciprocity. He also had instructions to
negotiate, in hard fact, a reciprocity treaty. This essay aims to show how he did both.

TRADE DEBATES BEFORE RAGUET’S MISSION
The years preceding Raguet’s mission in Brazil were a time of protectionist ascendency. The
growth of U.S. imports after 1815, following the end of the wars in North America and Europe,
depressed American manufacturers. The Panic of 1819 only increased the clamor for protection.
Conventions and societies for the encouragement of manufactures by way of tariff protection
sprouted up, and a Congress favorable to a protective policy was elected with Henry Clay as
Speaker of the House.5
Glimpses of Raguet up to this time offer an image, however hazy, of his early views on
the tariff and reciprocity. For a short while after attending the University of Pennsylvania, where
he graduated probably in 1800, Raguet abided the will of his deceased father and studied law.6
His father, Claudius Raguet, had emigrated from France in 1780 and soon become a prosperous
Philadelphia merchant, ship owner, and privateer in the final years of the Revolutionary War.
The elder Raguet charted a different course for his son, whom he willed to take up the profession
of his brother-in-law, Jonathan Williams Condy, Esq., practitioner of the Philadelphia bar and
erstwhile clerk of the United States Congress.7 But Condy Raguet forsook his father’s wishes to
follow in his footsteps. He commenced his own “mercantile pursuits” first in a Philadelphia
counting house and then as supercargo for two voyages to the island of Hispañola in 1804-1806,
where he lived on the second occasion for a period of seven months.8 To make one’s living as a
merchant often implied liberal sympathies in trade policy – but in the particular case of Raguet,
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whose public prominence was not yet large enough for his sympathies to be recorded or noticed,
we cannot be sure.
Raguet’s prominence grew after serving first as Captain and then Lieutenant-Colonel in
the Pennsylvania militia during the War of 1812. It grew further, even before the war’s end,
when he sought and finally achieved election as a Federalist to the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives in 1814.9 Around this time Raguet developed an interest in political economy
amidst the collections of the Library Company of Philadelphia, of which he had become a
shareholder in 1810, and the Athenaeum, of which he was a founding member in 1814.10 He
collected more books through a religious connection. In his early adulthood, Raguet had become
attached to the New Church of Emmanuel Swedenborg; he later gave a fellow disciple in London
“some discretionary power in the purchase of Books upon Political Economy” to send back to
Philadelphia. The shipment included a volume of Parliamentary Debates, reports of the Bullion
Committee (1810), and an item by David Ricardo on “Currency” (presumably his Proposals for
an Economical and Secure Currency [1816]), among other works.11 Raguet honed his interest
into expertise by making speeches to the Pennsylvania House and writing essays and reports on
topical issues, especially money and banking, including an early “Inquiry Into the Causes of the
Present State of the Circulating Medium of the United States” (1815). By 1816 he was not only a
prosperous Philadelphia merchant and respected gentleman and public servant, but also president
of the Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities (later the First
Pennsylvania Bank) and principal founder of the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society.12 In 1818
he was elevated from the Pennsylvania House to the Senate. His responsibilities became
weightier and his reports for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania numerous.
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Among Raguet’s reports to the Pennsylvania Senate was what appears to be the first
public document attributable wholly or largely to him that touched explicitly on tariffs and
reciprocity. He was co-instigator and leading member of a committee of seven senators
appointed to explain the “distressed and embarrassed state of the commonwealth” in the wake of
the Panic of 1819.13 Raguet’s reflections on the problem must have been painful. The panic had
cost him his fortune. He was reduced, according to his friends’ later account, “from affluence to
poverty.”14
The explanation Raguet gave on behalf of the committee in January 1820 centered on the
banking system. The cause of the general distress, he said, was “to be found chiefly in the abuses
of the banking system, which abuses consist first in the excessive number of banks, and secondly
in their universal bad administration.” In short, a proliferation of banks had loaned in terrible
excess of their capital; “individuals of every profession were tempted to embark in speculation”
until “the dreadful day of retribution at length arrived.”15
The speculative disease had symptoms that were manifested in international trade.
According to Raguet, foreign imports, like domestic consumption in general, had grown beyond
what was justified by the country’s real resources. But he demurred at “the arguments advanced
by some” that lack of protection for domestic manufactures had been instrumental in causing the
distress. People in manufacturing towns might feel protection to be lacking, said Raguet, but not
the “great mass of the people of the commonwealth.” Nevertheless he communicated the
committee’s opinion that, “in the present circumstances of the world,” the government should
assist manufactures “by such public aid, as will prevent their prostration by the jealous rivalry of
foreign states.”16
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Despite the committee’s disavowal of the protectionist explanation of the Panic of 1819,
the foregoing opinion might be read as an endorsement of protectionism. It was not quite that. A
motion made jointly by Raguet and a Senate colleague two months later, in March 1820, clarifies
what the committee meant in reference to “the present circumstances of the world.” The
protracted European wars, they observed, had created a large demand for U.S. products and
promoted an extensive and beneficial trade. But, they added, “the same reciprocity which has
been the foundation of a trade mutually advantageous, cannot in the nature of things continue to
the extent which has heretofore prevailed.”17
To wit, Europe’s need for American agriculture would diminish in peacetime. Americans
would have to create a demand at home for what they could no longer sell abroad; they would
have to learn to manufacture the goods they had become accustomed to importing. But in this
effort they would confront “the rivalry of foreign manufacturers, aided by the protection of their
respective governments” conspiring to nip in the bud the future competition of American
manufacturers. The trouble that Raguet and his colleague identified was not that the United
States’ specialization in agriculture was pernicious, but that specialization to the previous (and
“advantageous”) extent was impossible. It was not that American manufacturers faced foreign
competition, but that the competition was “forced” by foreign governments. “Reciprocity,”
which in more fortuitous circumstances implied a liberal trade policy, implied in prevailing
circumstances a degree of countervailing protection.18
If the argument sat uneasily with free trade, neither was it unambiguously protectionist.
The emerging protectionist doctrine opposed importation on a large scale not in special
circumstances but in most circumstances. The contrast is marked by the words of Mathew Carey,
who wrote in April 1819 that Adam Smith was “duped by his own system.” The myriad
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mercantile restrictions and outright commercial prohibitions of the British government, which
were “the antipodes of the doctrines of Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations,” conferred in
Carey’s view “immense advantages.”19 Raguet, who was well and respectfully acquainted with
Carey, did not go that far.
Raguet’s private letters show more precisely how far he went with Carey and where he
parted ways. Among the societies promoting the encouragement of domestic manufactures that
sprouted up during the Panic of 1819, Raguet served one as Secretary.20 But when Carey invited
him late in 1819 to sign a circular advanced by another, the Philadelphia Society for the
Promotion of National Industry, Raguet declined, citing his disagreement with that society’s
notions about the root cause of “the distress that has spread so generally through the country.”
Presaging the content of his Senate report, Raguet laid blame not on trade policy but on the
banking system. What was more, he explained, to endorse the notions of Carey’s society to the
letter would be to abandon “the very basis of the system of political economy, upon which I am
willing to stake my reputation as a publick man.”21 On the other hand, the very next day he
offered the same society his services to undertake a mission to Washington, D.C. to see whether
the Government might provide additional protection to Pennsylvania manufacturers. He asked
only that he should be reimbursed by the society and that he should present himself not as a
partisan but “as a mere spectator of passing events.”22
A little over a year later, in correspondence with David Ricardo, Raguet expressed
complete agreement with the “liberal sentiments … relative to the intercourse between the
United States and Great Britain” that his eminent correspondent had expostulated in a previous
letter. Although “this nation … must needs become a manufacturing one,” he continued, many
people held the view “that if our attention is to be directed towards manufactures, it had better be
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done without an artificial excitement.”23 Raguet implied that he was among those many, but he
did not say so unambiguously.
In his paces over the middle ground between free-trade principles and high-tariff
expediency, Raguet could be seen as calculating, or, perhaps, vacillating. But a different view is
no less tenable. He could be seen as endeavoring carefully, at a moment of economic emergency,
to reconcile the principles of the new science of political economy with the political imperative
of state action. He was not the only one to seek a middle ground, and, to be sure, some of his
fellow travelers had notions that were calculated, uncertain, or even incoherent. The specific
state action they contemplated was the tariff bill introduced in April 1820 by the Hon. Henry
Baldwin of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the House Committee on Manufactures.
It was mainly to Baldwin that Raguet had directed his inquiries on behalf of Carey’s
society; the bill that emerged four months later from Baldwin’s committee proposed to increase
tariffs on most imported goods by one-third to two-thirds.24 Speaking in support of the bill,
Henry Clay, the champion of protection in the legislative arena, acknowledged that the maxim
“Let things alone!” was indeed a “truth in the books of European political economists.” But it
was misapplied insofar as it was thought to require passivity in response to “the operation of
foreign governments” on domestic interests. “I am a friend to free trade,” Clay avowed, “but it
must be a free trade of perfect reciprocity.”25 Another of the bill’s supporters, Representative
Charles Kinsey of New Jersey, expressed particular agreement with Adam Smith. Smith’s
remark in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations that “the inland or home trade” was “the most
important of all” appears to have been especially interesting to Kinsey, who drew from it,
together with his unaccountably false belief that Smith favored the British Corn Laws, the lesson
that the United States should therefore protect its manufactures.26 What is notable in these
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endorsements of tariff protection is that they did not dispute free-trade or Smithian principles in
the more conspicuous manner of Mathew Carey. They claimed that, under the circumstances, the
tariff bill was consistent with those principles. Raguet wrote in the same vein, although perhaps
more candidly than Clay and more cogently than Kinsey.
The failure of Baldwin’s tariff bill was a signal moment for advocates of a tariff for
reciprocity. Although the House passed the bill with 98 votes in favor and 71 against, the Senate
rejected it by a single vote.27 But the rejection was presented as merely a vote to “postpone the
bill until the next session.”28 Advocates and opponents alike treated the bill accordingly as a live
issue through the Congressional recess of May to November 1820, and into the next session. One
fact could not have escaped their attention: although the tariff had foundered in the Senate, other
bills framed by the reciprocity argument, including one providing for countervailing tonnage
duties on French ships and vessels, had passed both chambers with little or no controversy.29
Tariff advocates may have supposed that if increases were pitched for purposes of reciprocity
rather than protection per se, then the bill might yet pass.
Their supposition was supported by a history predating the last congressional session.
The imposition of countervailing duties on French vessels was but the latest in a series of acts
establishing the popularity, and also the meaning, of reciprocity after the War of 1812. The
several acts were aimed at either establishing or relinquishing selectively, vis-à-vis some partners
but not all, discriminatory duties on merchandise and tonnage. Even after the war’s end the most
important target remained Great Britain. The Reciprocity Act of March 3, 1815 promised to
abolish discriminatory duties on the tonnage of a partner’s ships as compared to U.S. ships, and
on merchandise imported in a partner’s ships as compared to U.S. ships, pending a reciprocal act
by that partner.30 Exactly four months later, with that act guiding their negotiations, U.S.
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plenipotentiaries completed a reciprocity treaty with Great Britain. Its main achievements were,
first, to provide for the reciprocal repeal of all duties discriminating between British and U.S.
ships sailing directly between the two countries (i.e. national treatment in direct navigation);
second, to provide reciprocal assurance that neither country would levy duties discriminating
between imports of the other’s merchandise and imports from the most-favored alternative
partner (i.e. most-favored-nation treatment in trade).31
Subsequent reciprocity acts were drawn up mainly to rectify what Americans perceived
as the lack of reciprocity in the latter treaty. Because it expressly did not provide for national
treatment in indirect trade between the two countries – via the British West Indies, where U.S.
ships were prohibited from trading – British ships had in fact a considerable advantage. Their
exclusive access to the triangular trade allowed them to undercut U.S. ships plying directly
across the Atlantic.32 So Congress acted. An act of April 27, 1816 levied discriminatory duties on
(among other things) cotton cloths originating beyond the Cape of Good Hope, meaning the
British dominions in the East Indies. An act of January 14, 1817 imposed a $2 per ton duty on
ships embarking from ports where U.S. vessels were not allowed to trade – exempting ships
enjoying privileges that might be granted by treaty with an amenable partner. More complicated
but less subtle was an act of March 1, 1817, prohibiting the importation in non-U.S. ships of any
merchandise except that which originated in the country to whose citizens the ship belonged,
excepting ships of any foreign nation that had not adopted a similar regulation. In effect, the act
prohibited British ships from carrying non-British cargoes to U.S. ports so long as Great Britain
excluded U.S. ships from trading in the West Indies.33 More acts in the same vein followed every
year from 1817 to 1820.34
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Like the bill for countervailing tonnage duties on French ships and vessels, reciprocity
along these lines was uncontroversial.35 Even such a navigation act as was passed on April 18,
1818 – which added “teeth” to the already biting one of March 1 of the previous year – passed
with minimal opposition in both the House and the Senate.36 The appeal of the policy cut through
doctrinal allegiances to free trade and protection.
The problem that the free traders’ allegiance to the reciprocity policy posed for their case
was embodied in William Bayard, President of the New York Chamber of Commerce. In
December of 1819, Bayard led the Chamber in memorializing Congress in favor of
countervailing tonnage duties on French ships. Over and above the standard tonnage duties and
lighthouse levies for foreign ships, the French government had imposed additional tonnage
duties for cotton, tobacco, and potash whenever they were imported in American rather than
French ships. The memorialists considered the French duties “altogether disproportionate and
unequal” and contrary to the principle of “fair reciprocity.” Upon reflection, they could “devise
no expedient more likely to produce a favorable change in the present system of the French
Government … than the imposition of a heavy tonnage duty.”37 Although the reasoning was
plausible enough, it fit awkwardly with Bayard’s subsequent memorial, issued in November
1820, on behalf of a convention of merchants worried about the revival of the Baldwin tariff bill
in the following session of Congress. The document reminded Congress of Adam Smith’s
warning that heavy taxes on necessaries were “‘a curse equal to the bareness of the soil and the
inclemency of the heavens’.” The proposed duties on foreign goods, it warned, would plunge the
United States “still deeper into all those measures of prohibition and restrictions upon trade; of
duties, premiums, and bounties; of stimulants to rear exclusive interests at the national expense,
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which have contributed more than any other causes to bring the greatest commercial and
manufacturing empire that the world ever saw to the very verge of destruction.”38
It could not have been difficult to see the counterargument that, if one wished at once to
maintain “fair reciprocity” with foreigners and not to “rear exclusive interests” at home, then to
impose countervailing duties on foreign ships and not on foreign goods, thereby securing
reciprocity for American commercial interests while excluding manufacturing interests, would
be a dubious method. At least Congressman Baldwin had no difficulty seeing the argument: he
articulated it when reintroducing the tariff bill to the House on January 15, 1821. His Committee
on Manufactures’ new report was replete with explicit appeals to the principle of reciprocity.
“Let there be no system of restriction, but one of reciprocity, of liberal interchange,” read the
report; “as one of the great family of nations, let our laws keep pace with theirs in liberality; let
them even make the first friendly offer.” U.S. laws regarding foreign shipping already reflected
those principles; “it is but for this Congress to apply its own principles to another co-ordinate and
equally important branch of national industry.”39 Baldwin even did Bayard the honor of
reprinting his remonstrance for countervailing duties on French tonnage in the report’s
appendix.40 Clearly, free traders trafficking in the reciprocity petard risked being hoist by it.
Not all free traders were insensitive to the risk. Virginian farmer and statesman John
Taylor of Caroline was so alert to it that he authored a jeremiad of almost 350 pages, Tyranny
Unmasked (1822), in response to Baldwin’s committee report. “We have not gained a single
victory in a twenty years’ war of restriction against restriction,” Taylor observed, “and the harder
we strike the enemy, the more severely the blow recoils upon ourselves.” Not only had
reciprocity never served the free-trade cause, it was appropriated by a class of people who, while
feigning affinity with the cause, were working to kill it. The ultimate victims, Taylor reckoned,
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were agriculturalists. Having been promised that retaliatory tariffs would eventually stimulate the
home market and open foreign markets, they would be disappointed on both counts. “Invigorate
us now with your blood, say the capitalists to the agriculturalists, and you shall bleed us in your
turn, after both you and ourselves are dead. This is the proposed restricted-reciprocal free
trade.”41
Such was the terrain of the tariff and reciprocity debate, and such were Condy Raguet’s
contributions to it, for roughly the decade up to 1822. It will be observed that Raguet’s call for
tariff protection toward the end of the period did not imply his devotion to protectionism, though
it did put him in league with protectionists. On the other hand, his free-trade sympathies, such as
they were, did not go as far in practice as William Bayard’s, let alone John Taylor’s. Nor did
Raguet harbor any suspicion of reciprocity in the manner of Taylor. Like Clay, he championed
reciprocity (in the form of countervailing duties not only on foreign tonnage but also foreign
goods) for purposes of propping up domestic manufacturers in the short run and encouraging free
trade in the long run. But in the latter purpose, unlike Clay, Raguet was probably sincere.
It will be observed, too, that despite his differences of opinion from protectionist
proselytizers and politicians, Raguet had good reason to believe they were not so great as to
disqualify him from service in the administration of the President James Monroe, an avowed
friend of protection.42 Indeed they were so narrow that his “taint of federalism,” as Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams would later put it archly, was of little account.43 Beginning in 1821, at
Raguet’s behest, his friends petitioned the administration for an appointment abroad. They knew,
as he freely admitted, that his financial misfortune required him to find a new source of income.
To U.S. Representative Thomas J. Rogers of Pennsylvania, Raguet wrote, “If I had a chance of
making money in a foreign country, I might in 7 to 10 years if I live, return to enjoy the residue
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of my days in my native land.” He pinned his hopes on Latin America, where independence from
Europe augured new consular positions, and where Raguet felt “a great interest in the Patriot
cause.”44 Conveniently, the South American diplomacy of President Monroe and Secretary
Adams was of a piece with the reciprocity policy: both sought to establish the United States’
commercial prerogatives and dismantle exclusive privileges favoring one country or another. In
peacetime, the privileges at issue were preferences for goods and ships of the Old World in the
ports of the New. (The U.S. pressed for an equal footing.) In wartime, they were the rights of
belligerents to search and seize ships and merchandise bound for enemy ports. (The U.S sought
to enlarge the rights of neutrals.)
Raguet had other qualities, besides, that recommended him for service in Monroe’s
administration, especially in some consular or diplomatic capacity. He had lived abroad; he had
been trained in law and had practiced both commerce and politics; he had friends in society and
knew how to keep them, and even serve their interests, despite shades of difference of opinion.
And yet his standing in law, commerce, politics, and society was not so great as to startle the
European countries that were watching closely. As Monroe explained privately, his appointees to
South America were not to be marked by any “distinguished eclat” lest they stir up European
apprehensions about U.S. designs.45 So wrote the President one day after submitting Raguet’s
name to the Senate for its advice and consent regarding a possible appointment as U.S. Consul at
Rio de Janeiro.46

THE BRAZIL MISSION
Raguet’s duties upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro in September of 1822 were not, at least by
official sanction, of a diplomatic character. They were supposed to be of the commercial and
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informational kind usually befitting U.S. consuls.47 But circumstances soon called upon Raguet
to act above his pay grade. The regent of Brazil, Dom Pedro, had declared his country
independent of Portugal just the day before Raguet’s ship landed on September 8. War with the
colonial master followed, and with it came obstructions of foreign commerce and impressment of
foreign seamen. Raguet attended diligently to U.S. interests by interceding repeatedly with the
Brazilian government, notwithstanding his modest status and correspondingly modest pay.48 The
revolution, then, was fortuitous for him: it justified his request to Adams for a more elevated
rank and a salary that could sustain his family.49 In approving the request, Adams made him
“agent of the United States for commercial affairs” – a diplomatic position that would not signal
U.S. recognition of Brazil’s independence. When at last the U.S. determined to send that signal,
in March 1825, Raguet was promoted to Chargé d’Affaires.
Raguet’s promotion was one of the first acts of John Quincy Adams’s Presidency, and his
instructions among the first penned by Henry Clay as Secretary of State.50 The instructions
continued seamlessly Adams’s reciprocity policy. To Clay, after all, reciprocity was not merely a
passing enthusiasm: it was part and parcel of his “American System.”
Clay’s system looked at once outward to U.S. leadership and trade in the hemisphere and
inward to the protection of domestic industry. The aims were not contradictory. The new
countries of the hemisphere, Clay expected, would be a bulwark against British and European
anti-Republicanism as well as a “vent” for surplus manufactures and grain, trading in return raw
materials and consumables that presented no threat to U.S. producers. But commanding the trade
of the hemisphere depended crucially on U.S. ships entering the ports of the hemisphere on equal
terms with foreign rivals. Where they did not, “perfect reciprocity” required reciprocal
restrictions of trade – with the offer, perhaps, of reciprocal abandonment of restrictions. Clay
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endorsed forcefully the United States’ policies along those lines in relation to the West Indies
trade. He had long had, and still had, greater hopes for trade with South America.51
On that subject, therefore, Adams and Clay were of like minds. When Adams was
Secretary of State, he had directed his chargé in Buenos Aires to “strenuously maintain the right
of the United States to be treated in every respect on the footing of the most favoured; or as it is
more properly expressed, the most friendly nation … and should you negotiate a Treaty of
Commerce you will make that principle the foundation of all its provisions.”52 Now Clay
dispatched to Rio de Janeiro, in words similar to Adams’s, a warning to the newly invested
Chargé Raguet: “France and Great Britain will probably strive to obtain for themselves peculiar
advantages in the trade with Brazil … You will resist, firmly, and constantly, any concessions to
the Commerce or Navigation of either of those two powers, which are not equally extended to
the Commerce and Navigation of the United States.” Clay also gave Raguet the prerogative to
propose a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation. Its general aims would be to give Brazil
better terms in navigation in return for eliminating the preference, to the extent of 9% ad
valorem, that Brazilian customs gave to British goods over American ones.53
The treaty was a project that would consume much of Raguet’s attention but deliver few
positive results. Impeding him were, first, the untimely receipt and strange paucity of his
diplomatic credentials and instructions from Washington and, second, the outbreak of war
between Brazil and the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata over the disputed territory of the
Banda Oriental in present-day Uruguay. The impediments were consequential not only to the
effectiveness of Raguet’s diplomacy, but also to his later career and thought as a political
economist and polemicist.
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At the moment Clay wrote Raguet’s instructions, conditions were ripe for the negotiation
of a commercial treaty. By Raguet’s account, beginning in February 1825 the Brazilian
government anticipated the arrival of the British diplomat, Sir Charles Stuart, to mediate between
itself and Portugal. Although Brazil’s independence was not in doubt, the new nation might have
drawn some advantage from being able to “boast, as least, of having been recognized by one
Foreign Power.”54 The arrival of Raguet’s credentials as Chargé d’Affaires would have served
that end; the more concrete evidence of U.S. recognition manifested by a treaty would have
served even better. But a mishap at sea caused the credentials to be waylaid in Buenos Aires.
They did not reach Rio de Janeiro until the 23rd of October, by which date Charles Stuart had
already done his work, Brazil’s independence from Portugal was recognized by the mother
country, and U.S. recognition “was no longer a matter of any sort of consequence.”55
Raguet followed his instructions nonetheless, and, proposing a treaty, found the Brazilian
government willing if not eager to proceed. He informed Clay of the fact, adding some
observations about the disadvantages Americans suffered from Brazil’s discrimination in favor
of Great Britain.56 Because he had been given permission only to propose a treaty – not to
negotiate one, as he was plainly eager to do – he could do no more than leave the matter at that
and await additional credentials and instructions. Meanwhile, the eruption of hostilities between
Brazil and Buenos Aires made the treaty’s prospects more remote. Brazil declared war and a
blockade of all enemy ports in December 1825.57 The remainder of Raguet’s mission would be
devoted mainly to remonstrating against Brazilian violations of professed U.S. commercial
rights.
At the beginning of the blockade, his remonstrations were courteous assertions of
principle. Informed by a careful reading of U.S. diplomatic correspondence with European
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governments, Raguet explained to the Brazilian Foreign Minister immediately and at length the
international law of blockades as construed by his own government. Because a blockade was not
to be proclaimed capriciously or enforced arbitrarily, in order to be legal it had to be effective. A
merely “paper blockade,” consisting of proclamations but not warships in harbors, amounted to
the belligerent’s threat to harass neutral seamen and merchants unpredictably with “advantages
not due to the positive force of his arms.” The United States denied the legality of an ostensible
general blockade of Argentina by a country such as Brazil because the besieged had too many
ports, and the besieging too few ships, to make the blockade generally effective. What was more,
even if the blockade were legal, in order to capture or confiscate legally any ships violating it,
the belligerent had to have given prior warning of its existence. Not even the “refinements of
modern sophistry,” averred Raguet, could shake “this just and equitable rule.”58
Because he was not expressly instructed to write such a letter, the assuredness of
Raguet’s tone was, by his own account, greater than he felt. He “accordingly waited with much
anxiety” for confirmation from Clay of the correctness of his position he adopted.59
Correspondence with Washington took about two months each way, give or take a couple of
weeks – yet he received no word through August of 1826. At the end of that month, still without
a word of approval from Clay, he faced a severe test of the principles he had expounded the
previous December.
On August 29th, the brig Ruth of Philadelphia, bound originally for Buenos Aires, was led
into the harbor of Rio de Janeiro by a Brazilian warship that had intercepted it at sea. The Ruth’s
course, according to the testimony of its supercargo, had already been diverted to Montevideo
after intelligence of the blockade was received from a passing ship. But because it was
intercepted hundreds of miles east of both ports, there was no independent evidence of its being
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bound for one or the other.60 It was captured nonetheless and a “prize crew” of twelve Brazilians
boarded to steer it in convoy to Rio. During the passage, all of the Ruth’s crew except the cook,
ten men in total, were taken prisoner on the warship; the supercargo claimed that some were
pressed temporarily into service onboard. Upon reaching Rio’s harbor all ten were transported to
a Brazilian prison ship, the Prézéganga – “the common receptacle of convicts, murderers, and
pirates,” as Raguet put it to the Minster of Foreign Affairs – there to confront “the most revolting
scenes of vice, profligacy and misery, which the human mind can imagine.”61
From the American point of view, here was an incident of illegal blockade, and more.
The norms of executing blockades were violated in detail, from removing the crew from their
vessel to impressing them on another vessel to imprisoning them under poor conditions after
reaching safe harbor. Particularly shocking to Raguet was the base treatment of the Ruth’s
captain, mate, and above all its supercargo, whose position he had occupied in another time and
place and whose status he must have identified with closely. Upon learning of the incident he
tracked down the Minister of Foreign Affairs at a tea party, reminding him that Americans
valued their liberty “at a greater price than all property; and that if Brazil was desirous of
avoiding a war with the United States, she must respect that liberty.” Not even the Brazilian who
ranked highest in his esteem was spared his fury. To José da Silva Lisboa, a distinguished
political economist and apostle of Adam Smith whom Raguet had presented recently for
membership to the American Philosophical Society, and who also happened to be the Minister’s
chief clerk, he pledged that if the crew of the Ruth were not released without delay, he “would go
to the end of the world” to prove Brazilians “not to be a civilized people.”62
That such harsh language was extraordinary in diplomatic discourse, and that it was
likely to offend the Brazilian government, Raguet knew well. He also knew that it might incur
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the censure of his own government. But, then again, so might a lack of zeal or effectiveness in
support of its interests, which he thought to be under extraordinary assault. Without instructions
to the contrary, and mindful that “publick duty should outweigh all calculations of private
interest,” he resolved to continue to express himself unflinchingly “in the language of truth.”63
To his hazard, he would do so not only to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry but also to Secretary
Clay.
To Raguet, the incident of the Ruth was no unique occurrence. It was the last straw. “My
residence in this country, of four years,” he wrote to Clay, had been “nothing but a continued
record of wrongs inflicted by this Government and its officers, upon our commerce, our citizens,
and our national honor, in return for numerous acts of kindness and forbearance.” The inflictions
could be stopped only by a show of determination from the President and Secretary of State that
had been conspicuously lacking. What were needed were “positive and determinate instructions,
as would enable me to speak to this Government in the only language that can cause respect for
our rights, I mean, language addressed to its fears.” For such instructions he had waited
expectantly. But, he added pointedly, “in this expectation, I have thus far been disappointed.”
He had not received “a single line” from Clay, or anyone else in the State Department, for nearly
a year and a half. And without being able to say credibly that his government backed specific
“decisive measures” – such as his own recall and a rupture of relations if the Brazilian
government should not immediately surrender and pay damages for all U.S. vessels seized
illegally – he despaired of his ability to defend U.S. interests, to say nothing of advancing them.
Presenting the argument in a more positive light, but no less urgently, he exhorted, “Now is the
moment to make our nation respected by this. Now is the moment to make this Government feel
the influence, which we are destined to maintain in this hemisphere of liberty – and if it be

23
desirable to negociate [sic] a treaty of commerce, perhaps now is the moment, when the footing
of the most favoured nation might be obtained as the price of a reconciliation …”64
One can hardly imagine a more forceful expression of the principle of reciprocity. It was
couched, too, in words that might have been expected to appeal to Clay, as they echoed Clay’s
past speeches in Congress. But it would take some time to learn whether the exhortation had its
desired effect.
In the first few months of the interim, Raguet experienced more frustrations followed by
some qualified successes. The controversy over the Ruth was compounded, through November
1826, by additional incidents involving the capture of American vessels and seamen.65 In
December, however, the Brazilian government notified Raguet that its navy would thereafter
interdict only those neutral vessels directing themselves unmistakably toward blockaded ports,
not those encountered on the high seas with the possible destination of Montevideo. The new
policy was offered up in the manner of a favor, not in acceptance of U.S. principles, and it was
not accompanied by payment of damages for past acts. Still, the rationale for it – namely, the
Emperor’s wish “to avoid such disputes as that which exists with respect to the brig Ruth” –
allowed Raguet to believe that his harsh expressions were having some good effect. And at the
end of the month he received word from Clay, who wrote that the President had seen “with
approbation” his “zealous exertions to prevent, in the existing war between the Brazils and
Buenos Ayres, and abuse of the law of blockade.” The letter was dated 22 October and referred
to Raguet’s actions before those on behalf of the Ruth beginning in late August. But he read it
nonetheless as an endorsement of his general course.66
Another part of the letter, however, was troubling. It contained unexpected instructions
on the matter of the commercial treaty. Since November of 1825, Raguet had been awaiting the
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credentials to negotiate the treaty that he had already proposed at Clay’s behest, which overture
the Brazilian government had already accepted. Consistent with Clay’s initial instructions and
according to Brazilian wishes, the negotiations were to take place at Rio. The new letter
suggested inexplicably that Raguet should “ascertain if there exist a disposition” on the part the
Brazilian government to negotiate a treaty, and, if so, that he should attempt to move the seat of
negotiation away from Rio. But if the Brazilians showed a “decided preference” to negotiate at
Rio, then the President would “acquiesce … and send instructions to open such a negotiation,
accordingly.”67, 68
Raguet read the letter as more evidence of his superior’s fecklessness. The instructions,
he replied, left him in a “state of considerable embarrassment.” He had expected to be told to
negotiate, not to make a renewed offer to negotiate at (perhaps, but not necessarily) another
place. He could hardly do the latter “without an apology for the non-fulfillment of the existing
engagement, or without the assigning of some reasons for departing from a proposal of our
own.” Beyond being discreditable, though, such an offer would be disadvantageous. If the
Brazilians were given an opportunity to negotiate further over the negotiations, and so to delay
them, then they would probably seize it. For, by Raguet’s lights, “the science of political
economy has not yet made sufficient progress in this country to qualify the government for the
belief, that a treaty of reciprocity with the United States, would be other than one by which they
would profit more than Brazil.”69 He advised again that negotiations should begin in Rio as soon
as possible, and awaited again the necessary credentials.
Again, however, before any instructions arrived, a dispute erupted between Raguet and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It would prove to be the final one. A former U.S. warship that
was under private ownership, the Spark, had arrived in Rio on January 27th for the purpose of its
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sale to the Brazilian government. When the Minister of Marine saw fit to buy only its guns, not
the ship, the captain determined not to sell and instead to set sail for Montevideo in search of
another buyer. Before leaving port, he took on double the passengers and crew that he had upon
arrival. His reason, as Raguet related the incident, was his discovery during the passage to Rio
that the smaller crew was insufficient for the ship.70 Cleared by customs, and receiving the
customary visit for inspection and approval of paperwork before final departure, the Spark exited
the harbor. Several miles from land, it was intercepted and boarded by the commander of an
armed Brazilian steamboat under orders of the Minister of Marine – in whose mind its usefulness
as a warship, its increase in crew size, and its destination “for the waters of La Plata” aroused
suspicions concerning its “true character.”71 Most of the Spark’s crew was taken prisoner aboard
the steamboat and a prize crew was substituted for the short trip back to the harbor. There it was
subjected to a rigorous and damaging inspection, resembling to Raguet “the ransacking of a
vessel by a band of freebooters,” and Raguet himself was called upon to controvert “the strong
suspicion of her being a privateer bound for Buenos Ayres.”72
In its barest details, the interdiction of the Spark was bound to appear to Raguet as a
violation of American maritime principles similar to that of the Ruth. In fact he considered it
worse. It was “one of the most deliberate and high-handed insults against our flag and national
honour.” It was committed, moreover, “by the express orders” of the Brazilian government. And
he read the request that he should explain the ship’s character as an “official insult.”73 (Raguet
deigned reply that although he would have complied cheerfully before Spark had been cleared to
sail, “in the present state of the affair … he declines giving any explanations.”74) The
aggravating circumstances related mainly to the timing of the Minister of Marine’s orders to the
intercepting steamboat. The government held that the Minister was only informed of the crucial
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piece of information, to wit, the Spark’s unusually large crew, after the ship had “crossed the
bar” to exit the harbor, and only after that did he issue the orders to the steamboat. Raguet
claimed that there was “scarcely a Brazilian or Foreigner in Rio de Janeiro” who did not know
the steamboat to have been the first vessel to disembark, and hundreds knew besides that the
steamboat’s commander received his orders the night before.75 If Raguet’s claim was correct,
then the Spark’s clearance for departure would appear to be merely a ruse to facilitate its
interdiction at sea and subsequent ransacking; and the only motive he could conceive for that
was to render the ship unfit for use by either enemy or friend.
Seeing “not a shadow of doubt” that the Brazilian government had plotted to confiscate
and damage American property, harass American citizens, and cover its tracks with official lies,
Rauget notified the Foreign Minister of his withdrawal from the Court of Brazil and requested
his passports.76 To Clay, he wrote that he had no dignified alternative: his action was “the ultima
ratio of a People which sincerely desires to preserve the relations of peace with all the world
upon honourable terms.” Although he was lauded roundly by Rio’s expatriates, he was uncertain
enough of his superiors’ sharing their sentiments – or perhaps he had enough political intuition –
that he saw fit to affirm his preparedness “to meet all the consequences, even though one of them
should be, my being offered up as a sacrifice on the altar of publick good.”77
A short while later, on the eve of his departure for the United States, Raguet received the
first unhappy indication that his intuition was keen. Clay’s response to his report on the Ruth
affair reached him on March 30th. Without denying the “strong character of some of those
injuries” for which Raguet had demanded redress from the Brazilian government, Clay observed
that “it is the fate of all maritime nations, neutral in maritime wars, to find their commerce and
navigation often exposed to serious vexations.” If the United States believed such vexations to
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warrant war, as Raguet had intimated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then its history would
have been marked by hardly a year of peace. Nor was that the only reproof that Clay had the
“painful duty” to convey. The President “would have been better satisfied,” he went on, if
Raguet had avoided such “provoking and irritating expressions” as the one about “civilized
people” that he had tried with José da Silva Lisboa. As to the point that “decisive measures”
were needed to countervail the catalog of wrongs committed against the United States, Clay
reminded him that the decision rested with the President. If Raguet was impatient or dissatisfied
with the decision, then he should simply recollect that the President “is enabled, at this distance,
to take a calmer view of things than you are.”78
Among the few authors who have assessed Raguet’s diplomacy, most stand nearer to
Adams’s and Clay’s point of view than to the disappointed chargé’s. They behold the failed
diplomacy of a man of flawed character. Nobody questions his intellect or dedication to his
duties: William R. Manning, for instance, takes note of the remarkable erudition that he and his
Brazilian counterparts displayed in their voluminous correspondence. But in the same breath
Manning supposes that Raguet’s impatience got the better of his judgment. L. F. Hill, while
admitting that he could have benefitted from more timely instructions, judges him to have been
impetuous. Daniel Joseph Ahearn, Jr., determines that he had an undiplomatic disposition.
Antonia Fernanda Pacca de Almeida Wright calls him irascible and wonders whether he had an
explosive temperament. All of these assessments echo that of Adams, who complimented him
publicly for his “zeal” but gauged him privately to be a man of “temper and want of judgment,
who took blustering for bravery and insolence for energy.”79
I wish to promote a different view. The foregoing assessments credit mainly witnesses
who were interested in putting the onus for the diplomatic fracas on Raguet – above all Adams.
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It requires no doubt of Adams’s sincerity to suppose that a fair assessment would balance his
impressions with others that were equally well informed but different. Of these there were
several. As Zelia Sá Viana Camurça observes, “it is known that Condy Raguet was not a man
who lost his temper easily. Quite the contrary, he was known by his contemporaries as a
gentleman of kind and sober manners.”80 Such contemporaries included his most distinguished
compatriots in Rio, who took some pains to make known their opinion of the character of Chargé
Raguet. At the end of his mission, during a public dinner in his honor, a committee of five of
them headed by William Wright, then U.S. consul, offered their “testimonial of their unqualified
and perfect approbation” of his conduct. In carrying out his official duties, they declared, Raguet
had been “patient and temperate.”81
In the final analysis, temperament is a dubious explanation of Raguet’s threats to the
Brazilian government and his requests for threats from Washington. A likelier explanation is that
they were consequences not of his personal disputatiousness but his principles of diplomacy.
Months before the incidents of the Spark and Ruth, Adams declared to Congress his
principles. “In the intercourse between nations,” he said, “temper is a missionary, perhaps, more
powerful than talent. Nothing was ever lost by kind treatment, Nothing can be gained by sullen
repulses and aspiring pretensions.”82 The declaration manifests the standard by which Adams
sized up Raguet. It also presents a debatable proposition. Is indeed nothing ever lost by kind
treatment? If kindness is shown to a recalcitrant friend or hostile foe, one loses at least an
opportunity to signal that recalcitrance or hostility will not be received kindly. Reciprocity, as the
policy was understood in the early nineteenth century and advocated by Raguet no later than
1819, was justified by the belief that the opportunity should not be lost. Adams subscribed to that
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belief, at least in theory. In fact, he was more ambivalent about it than Raguet, who, during his
Brazil mission, embraced it completely.

FROM DIPLOMAT TO DOCTRINAIRE
Besides expressing approbation of Raguet’s conduct, the committee of his admirers in Rio
wished that his deeds would be “gratefully appreciated” at home.83 As it happened, upon his
arrival in New York on May 31, 1827, after six weeks at sea, he found that his deeds had already
been deprecated. The Brazilian government had dispatched hurriedly a messenger in advance of
Raguet to press its side of the story.84 Even before the messenger’s arrival, the pro-administration
National Intelligencer, having caught an early whiff of the controversy, speculated that Raguet’s
conduct might not have been “altogether that which the occasion called for.”85 Once the
Brazilian side of the story was out, speculation hardened into conviction.
On May 30, the Brazilian chargé in Washington assured Clay of “the pacific views of his
Majesty the Emperor of Brazil” and the Emperor’s readiness to settle the Spark dispute to the
United States’ satisfaction. All that was required was the dispatch to Rio of a new and more
suitable American representative and a public statement of the American government’s
disapproval of Raguet’s conduct. Clay declined to make the second concession on the grounds
that, in regards to Raguet’s departure from the Court of Brazil, he was “accountable to his own
government, and to that only.” But Clay also made known that the departure was “without
orders” and Raguet’s “personal act.” What was more, the Brazilian government need not fear the
interruption of relations that might have been expected to follow from the act. “No such
interruption exists at Washington,” Clay assured, and the President would willingly nominate a
successor to Raguet given the promise that American claims would be settled promptly.86
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Raguet’s “sacrifice on the altar of publick good,” as he had foreseen it, was settled in
Washington on the very day he landed in New York. As the National Intelligencer saw it, the
government had only observed “the principles on which it is desired that our diplomatic
intercourse with Brazil should be conducted” while demonstrating the necessity of “temperance
and courtesy on the part of its functionaries.”87
President Adams, for his part, announced in his annual message to Congress that
Raguet’s conduct had “not been disapproved” by him. But privately, when debriefing Raguet in
Washington, he told him that a better course would have been to await instructions. Perhaps a
stronger signal of the President’s private disapproval was his unwillingness to give Raguet
another diplomatic position. The former chargé, back in his country but without an income, faced
the maddening task of defending himself against an allegation of his unfitness for public trust
that was implied but not openly stated. As Raguet put it, “the public was left to judge for itself,
whether the term ‘not disapproved’ was such, as in diplomatic usage, was or was not intended to
express an unqualified approval.” His continuing absence from government service must have
been evidence enough, to most minds, to make the judgment. Yet when he petitioned Congress
to divulge his diplomatic correspondence and to hold a public investigation to clear his name, he
was met with the response that, as the President had not disapproved of his conduct, there was
nothing to clear. And his petitions against a phantom allegation only reinforced the notion about
his temperament that he was intent to combat.88
Political circumstances alone, however, would have ensured that Raguet did not lack
allies. He had come home to a political climate considerably more poisonous than that which he
had left five years before. One toxin was the alleged “corrupt bargain” in the alliance between
Adams and Clay that denied Andrew Jackson the presidency in 1824. By the summer of 1827 it
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had not dissipated in the least.89 Another source of controversy that was redoubled in 1824 and
had not waned was the tariff act of that year. The act, which F. W. Taussig has called “the first
and most direct fruit of the early protective movement,” achieved most of the protectionists’
aims in the skirmishes of 1819 to 1822.90 Its opponents protested bitterly. Southerners in
particular warned of “governmental usurpations”; the Virginia General Assembly resolved that
the act, which transferred property from one portion of the country to another, was
“unconstitutional, unwise, unjust, unequal, and oppressive.”91 The unconstitutionality of the
tariff was a new and ominous allegation – yet protectionists pressed their cause still further,
especially in respect to woolens. Mathew Carey was co-ringleader of a convention assembling in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in July of 1827 to support a bill “for the promotion of manufactures
and the mechanic arts,” especially woolens.92 The convention and its address provoked the
opposition of a committee of Boston free traders: their 196-page counter-report, authored by
Henry Lee, an affluent Boston merchant and political economist, took on the larger purpose of
refuting systematically the American System. Lee assailed Henry Clay as much as Mathew
Carey, and, in so doing, advanced a version of the unconstitutionality argument that had lately
been used in the South.93 In short, Raguet was not the only one with a grievance against his
political masters. In many quarters, and not only in the South, the grievances had reached a fever
pitch. They were heighted by a widespread belief that the political maneuvers and public
legislation of John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and their abettors were virtually, or even
literally, unlawful.
As the election of 1828 approached and Raguet’s efforts to force a public reckoning with
him continued, his case took on symptoms of the same fever. Anti-administration newspapers
like the New York Evening Post and the New York Argus took his side against the likes of the
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National Intelligencer.94 By his own account, Raguet “resolved, that if access to the Legislature
of the nation, and through it to the bar of public opinion, could only be obtained through a party
channel, to such party channel would I apply.”95 He appealed to the Jacksonian opponents of the
politicians who had cut him loose. Although the appeal could not have improved appreciably the
odds of restoring his diplomatic status – not, at least, in an administration led by Adams and Clay
– it opened up different opportunities.
To the majority of Jackson’s supporters in the presidential campaign of 1828, especially
those in Northern entrepôts and Southern plantations, the Hero of New Orleans’s victory in the
Electoral College in early December came with urgent necessity of undoing the highly
protectionist “Tariff of Abominations” of the previous May.96 To undo it would require constant
proselytizing against the protective system in the manner that Niles’ Weekly Register had long
done in support of it. Anyone discerning or desperate enough might have seen an opening, in a
notoriously unlucrative profession, for a man with a certain combination of qualities: disciplined
in the epistolary arts, knowledgeable of government, well read in the new science of political
economy, and ready to enter the bruising fray of political controversy against the advocates of
protection (most notably Henry Clay). Raguet had demonstrated the first three qualities even
before his Brazil mission; circumstances during and after its end could not have failed to instill in
him the fourth; and he was indeed both discerning and desperate.97 He founded in Philadelphia
and began writing and editing The Free Trade Advocate and Journal of Political Economy, the
first issue of which was dated January 3, 1829.
From his first paragraph Raguet left no doubt about his aim. It was to demolish, through a
searching examination of its “labyrinth of error,” the policy that had “latterly been distinguished
by the appellation of ‘The American System’.”98 The policy error he had in mind was not U.S.
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government expenditures for internal improvements, nor was it encouragement of republican
governments throughout the hemisphere. He meant the American System’s other part: the
imposition of high or prohibitive duties on foreign manufactures “for the express purpose of
thereby affording, what is called protection to those individuals, who propose to manufacture
similar commodities within the United States.” The synecdoche was, presumably, a way of also
taking aim at Henry Clay without naming him.
The Free Trade Advocate’s general arguments against protective duties drew from the
common stock of early nineteenth century political economy. They followed the tradition of
Adam Smith, as refined by David Ricardo and Jean-Baptiste Say; their gist was expressed in the
newspaper’s banner, which read “LAISSEZ-NOUS FAIRE.” To wit, “legislative interference in
favour of any particular pursuit of industry, necessarily forces capital and labour from one
occupation to another.” The new occupation, being an “artificial” one, was necessarily less
productive of national wealth than the old and “natural” one. Besides being inefficient, such
interference was immoral. Tariffs in particular were “inseparably connected with an act of
injustice, by which a tax is levied upon one portion of the people, for the benefit of another
portion.”
These were but the previews of Raguet’s arguments that he set out in the first issue. In
subsequent issues he spun them out in myriad ways. Nobody has credited him with originality in
doing so – not even Raguet, who could hardly be accused of forgetting that he was chiefly an
“advocate.” Edward Stanwood says aptly that he “was a strong and a keen writer, quick to see
the weakness in an adversary’s position and persuasive in presenting his own views.” His
qualities earned him plaudits for disseminating political-economic ideas if not devising them.99
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For this essay’s purpose, Raguet’s unoriginality in propounding the principles of free
trade matters little. What matters is how he proposed to achieve free trade when, as a matter of
fact, not only the United States but also its partners practiced protection. The theory that Raguet
appropriated from Smith, Ricardo, and Say spoke mainly to the question of why free trade
should be established, not how.
To be sure, the canonical authors upon whom Raguet relied were not silent on the
question of reciprocity and countervailing duties. But they spoke to it only briefly: they were not
sure that it was, after all, a question of political economy. Smith did not include retaliation
among the good reasons for laying duties upon foreign merchandise. (They were, first, national
defense; second, eliminating the preference for foreign goods that would otherwise come with
domestic excises.) Retaliatory tariffs were instead a “matter of deliberation.” On one hand, they
might have good effects “when there is a probability that they will procure the repeal of the high
duties or prohibitions complained of.” On the other, that probability was small – and if repeal did
not follow, then one would be left not only with the foreign duties or prohibitions but also one’s
own country’s duties, which amounted to “a real tax upon the whole country.” In any event, the
deliberation was not within the realm of, as Smith put it in this instance, “the science of the
legislator.” It was the province of “that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman
or politician.”100
Say wrote similarly but more stridently. “Import duties and prohibitions have often been
resorted to as a means of retaliation,” he observed, while also noting, “this is the favourite plea,
and the basis of most commercial treaties.” If retaliation induced a partner to abandon its own
duties and prohibitions, then it would prove to be expedient “as a matter of mere policy.” But
one should keep in view that it was an act of vengeance that worked in the first place against
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oneself. “The only point in question,” Say affirmed, “is this, what degree of vengeance you are
animated by, and how much you will consent to throw away upon its gratification.” As for
treaties intended to reverse the damage by way of reciprocal concessions, they were the proper
objects of “odium,” because “the concession to one can only be rendered effectual by refusal to
others.” Far more enlightened was the commercial policy of the provinces of La Plata and St.
Domingo, which had lately “opened their ports to foreigners, without any demand for
reciprocity, and are more rich and prosperous than they ever were.”101
Raguet, it bears mentioning, knew particularly well the edition of Say’s Treatise on
Political Economy from which the foregoing passages are drawn. It was produced in 1821, with
a new translation of the introduction and additional notes, by his childhood friend, fellow
political economist, and constant interlocutor, Clement C. Biddle – with whom Raguet avowed
his “harmony of opinion” on most political subjects.102 He thought well enough of it to give a
copy while in Brazil to José da Silva Lisboa, the economist and diplomat whom he esteemed so
highly.103 One wonders what Lisboa thought, as he perused the book, about Raguet’s overtures
for a commercial treaty.
What Raguet himself had thought during his Brazil mission has been noted. In the thick
of the Ruth controversy, he had advised Clay that “the footing of the most favored nation might
be obtained as the price of a reconciliation.” At a calmer moment a few months later, before the
incident of the Spark, he had offered further that “no hesitation can be made to the immediate
opening of a negotiation” for a commercial treaty. The negotiation “would at all events enable us
to ascertain how far the american system [sic] would be likely to be embraced by this
Government.”104 To Raguet, no doubt, the American System had not then been freighted with the
same meaning he saw in it in 1828. He had used the term, presumably, in reference to the treaties
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Clay had supported and the United States had signed with Colombia in 1824 and Central
America in 1825.105 Those treaties were variations of the model that Raguet had expected the
United States to propose with Brazil – the first centered on the most-favored-nation (MFN)
principle for trade in each nation’s goods and for navigation, the second on MFN for trade in
each nation’s goods and the national-treatment principle for navigation.106 As far as commercial
treaties went, they were among the most liberal in the world. But Say’s admonition still applied:
even the Colombian and Central American treaties, and any other that might be modeled after
them, could be rendered effectual only by an implied threat. Simply put, without a treaty the
concessions would not be granted; if they were not granted, then the partner would suffer
discrimination. As Chargé d’Affaires, Raguet had approved of that prospect. He did so not in
submission to his boss, but earnestly and by his own deliberation.
Exactly two years later, as founder of the Free Trade Advocate, he appeared to
disapprove. “There are some who will admit the truth of our position in the abstract,” he
observed in his introductory essay, “but who will maintain, that the free trade policy is only
advantageous when generally adopted, and that where it is departed from by one nation, it is for
the interest of others, with whom she trades, to follow her example.” Raguet would not
countenance any contradiction of principles by facts. “To adopt the restrictive system merely
because another nation has adopted it,” he countered plainly, “would be as absurd, as a man to tie
his hands, that he might diminish his power to work, merely because other persons, with whom
he dealt, had the folly to tie theirs.”107 But the “restrictive system” that Raguet resisted in his
introduction was one calculated, by his description, to levy duties on British manufactured goods
in order to countervail the British Corn Laws. Would he hold to the same principles with respect
not only to goods but also to navigation?
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In the event, Raguet would not, at this time, positively repudiate as a free-trade
doctrinaire what he had sought as chargé. But he did not restrain himself merely for pride in his
past position or consistency with past deeds, and he did not fail to devise a painstaking
justification. To accept the reciprocity principle and the corollary of countervailing and
discriminating duties, in navigation if not goods trade, was indispensible for advancing the cause
of free trade – for a while at least. The occasion for Raguet’s justification of reciprocity was the
publication, first in the National Intelligencer, of a pair of letters by former President Madison
dated September and October, 1828, on the awfully fraught question of the constitutionality of
protective tariffs.
Those who argued the unconstitutionality of tariff protection grounded their argument in
a strict reading of Article I, Section 8. In clause 1, Congress’s power “to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises” was qualified by the stipulation that it should be used for three
legitimate purposes: “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare
of the United States.” Protection for domestic producers was not specified. In clause 3,
Congress’s power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” was circumscribed by the word
“regulate,” which some disbelieved to mean levying duties, because that had already been
disposed of in the foregoing clause; and “Commerce,” which some disbelieved to encompass any
more than the transportation of goods, not their production. The first and third clauses of Article
I, Section 8 came closest to granting Congress the power to levy tariffs for the protection of
domestic producers. If the power did not exist there, then it did not exist anywhere. On that
everyone agreed. But in the weighty opinion of President Madison – a Virginian at odds with the
Virginia General Assembly, and an author of the Constitution besides – the power did exist. He
focused on the third, or commerce, clause.
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His focus was not altogether sharp. He misquoted the clause repeatedly, saying that it
granted the power to regulate “trade” with foreign nations. According to common usage, claimed
Madison, “to regulate trade” connoted not only regulation of the act of trading but also
encouragement of the production of tradable things, particularly manufactures. (He could have
made the same claim with respect to “commerce” but it might not have rung as true: that word
had come to be associated rather more with the act of trading than the stuff traded.108) As for the
notion that “to regulate” did not mean to levy duties, he brushed it aside, observing that the
distinction could hardly be maintained in practice. Finally, and compellingly, he observed that
his interpretation was not his alone: it had been around since the first congress, wherein a
number of fellow sons of Virginia, of both the Federal and anti-Federal parties, “did not hesitate
to propose duties and to suggest even prohibitions in favour of several articles of her
production,” from coal to hemp to beef.109
There rested Madison’s legal case against the unconstitutionality argument. To it he
added a pragmatic case. If it were not admitted that the power to regulate trade embraced
encouragement of domestic production, then neither food staples nor “the essential implements
for the public safety” would be ensured a home market. Stretching the point, he proffered that,
given the “Let us alone” theory animating the unconstitutionality argument, “it would follow that
no monopolizing or unequal regulations of foreign nations could be counteracted.” Other
countries’ ships would be protected by navigation laws that the United States would be
powerless to countervail; the merchant marine, the bulk of the navy during wartime, would
wither away. In sum, acceptance of the argument would be tantamount to rejection of
reciprocity, which was “the only rule of intercourse among independent communities.” The
consequence would be a humiliating subservience to foreign powers.110
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Madison’s pragmatic case conflated goods and commerce, just as his legal case did. But
it was shrewd. It presented those making the unconstitutionality argument as proponents of
national weakness. It thus confronted free traders with a dilemma: maintain the argument and
appear craven in the public view, or renounce the argument and rely on the same stock that had
notably failed to turn the public against protection. After the protectionist mobilization of 1827
had begotten the Tariff of Abominations of 1828, the dismay of the prior year had turned to
alarm. Political scion, lawyer, and reformer Henry D. Sedgwick of New York City and
Stockbridge, Massachusetts, declared that “the people have not listened to the proof that this
system is baneful – they are bound to listen to the proof that it is illegal.”111 Plenty of free traders
put their hopes in that prospect, but plenty more feared it.
Raguet understood the peril. He devoted twelve pages of his newspaper to reprinting and
analyzing Madison’s letters, maneuvering carefully around both horns of the dilemma. His
approach was inspired unmistakably by Smith and Say. Pledging to subject Madison’s arguments
to “the maxims of the science to which they relate,” he would avoid direct engagement with the
legal case (which did “not appertain to the province of political economy”) and proceed to
examine the pragmatic one.112
Where Madison argued that countervailing duties were necessary for the support of the
merchant marine, Rauget acknowledged that he was, perhaps, right. But the reason had nothing
to do with “economical principles,” in light of which such duties were always unwise.
Retaliation against foreign restrictions would cause trade to be more restricted – and “what
would be thought of a man in want of provisions, who should insist upon it, that no bread was
better than half a loaf?” The reason for retaliatory duties could only be seen in light of “national
policy.” If naval glory and power hung in the balance, then a country might decide – “and very
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justly too we think” – that some “sacrifice in her economical calculations” were appropriate. The
appropriate instrument, then, would be a countervailing duty on the tonnage of foreign ships.
Although it would undoubtedly be prejudicial to the economic interests of the country, it could
possibly be expedient as a “way to maintain a navy for the defence of her commerce and her
harbours.” And it was precisely this instrument, Raguet added (violating for a moment his
promise not to treat questions of law), that the Constitution afforded in Article I, Section 8,
clause 3, “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... .”113
On its face, Raguet’s argument would seem to have helped free traders to dodge the
charge of cravenness at the cost of forfeiting the contest. But he added two qualifying points.
First, even as “national policy,” it was “manifestly unwise and impolitic to retaliate upon a
nation, which it was certain would retaliate again.” This dubious point he defended by
substituting one purpose for another. The purpose that he had already accepted as legitimate, in
agreement with Madison, was to provide for a national merchant marine; now he assumed it was
“to let the offending nation see the folly of her measures, and to induce her to abandon her
selfish and illiberal policy.” If the offender would see no folly, then retaliation was worse than
useless. Whether in such a case retaliation would be useless for protecting the merchant marine,
he did not say.114
Second, the possible expediency of countervailing tonnage duties did not apply to
countervailing goods duties. Great Britain, the presumptive offending nation, had in fact lowered
its duties lately on American cotton. But, Raguet allowed, suppose that it had not. Or consider
the offense of Britain’s Corn Laws, which hindered exports of American flour. Either way, what
would be achieved with a retaliatory refusal to buy British manufactures? “It has not the
character of national policy to recommend it, which attaches to the countervailing duty on
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tonnage,” Raguet answered; “the protection of commerce and the defence of the nation, cannot
be urged as reasons for its adoption.”115 His defense of this point, too, was conspicuously silent
on an obvious question. What if manufactures imported from Britain were, as Madison had put
it, “essential implements for the public safety”? To put it plainly, if duties on foreign tonnage
were justified in order to encourage the American merchant marine, and so in wartime to float a
navy, then why not impose duties on foreign woolens in order to encourage the American textile
manufactory, and so to clothe an army?
Madison’s argument was built upon on an opportune conflation of goods and commerce,
Raguet’s upon a questionable distinction between them. Still, if one accepted Raguet’s
distinction then his accomplishment was impressive. He trimmed the unconstitutionality
argument so as to spare its advocates from the brunt of Madison’s criticism. But he did not
wholly refute it: if the exigencies of “national policy” were to be found only in navigation, not
other branches of industry, then neither economic nor national considerations could be cited to
justify protection for manufactures. One could agree with Raguet and proceed to argue that,
because protection of such goods did not provide for either the common defense or the general
welfare, and because it did not relate to “commerce,” it was unconstitutional. Or one could agree
with him and proceed to make only economic and moral arguments against protection. If the
protective system was to be overturned (and Raguet to build his list of subscribers) then free
traders of different convictions on the constitutionality question would have to share some
common doctrinal ground. Raguet had just surveyed it. The doctrine embraced: (1) unilateral
repeal of protective duties on goods irrespective of their constitutionality; (2) reciprocity and
countervailing duties in navigation when expedient.
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REVERSES OF FREE-TRADE RECIPROCITY
Underlying the ground that Raguet had staked out for a free-trade consensus were numerous
circumstances that were bound to change. As they did, the ground shifted, particularly in respect
to free traders’ limited embrace of reciprocity. The first shift happened within the year.
In July, 1829, Secretary of State Martin Van Buren instructed the new Minister to Great
Britain, Louis McLane, to open negotiations with the United States’ most important trade
partner.116 The precise subject of the negotiations was a matter of much public conjecture – so
much that Van Buren followed up with another letter to McLane warning him of the “rumors and
speculations” about his mission.117 Raguet was complicit in spreading the rumors. In his issue of
The Free Trade Advocate for August 8, he repeated a report from unnamed sources that McLane
had been instructed to negotiate a treaty “upon the basis of a modification of our tariff, and of the
British corn laws.” Attentive readers might have expected Raguet to look askance such a deal,
which would substitute reciprocity for the rule of unilateral liberalization of trade in goods. In
fact, although he paused to wonder about the correctness of circumventing the express will of the
people’s representatives in Congress with the instrument of a treaty, he overcame his hesitation
and endorsed the idea warmly. Such a treaty would “permit the manufactures of one country,
where they can be produced to the best advantage, to be freely exchanged for the flour of the
other country, where grain can be produced to the best advantage.” And lest his readers suppose
that he considered reciprocity to be merely a second-best option, he pointed out that if the Corn
Laws were repealed unilaterally and without any preferences, then the additional British demand
for foreign wheat would be met by continental Europe and the Black Sea region. American
farmers would reap the benefits of more liberal trade with Great Britain only if it were secured
by treaty.118
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The reports about McLean’s instructions were false: they concerned navigation,
especially in the West Indies. As for protective duties on goods, Van Buren kept them
deliberately off the table: he doubted that Great Britain would bargain away the Corn Laws, and
anyway it was the United States’ “right and their duty” to persevere in protection for
manufactures.119 Raguet’s partial retreat from his doctrine may have appeared to be moot. In
fact, it signaled a precarious pliancy on his part that would soon find new expressions.
When Congress convened in December 1829, Raguet’s prospects were improving and his
influence increasing. He had moved his editorial efforts to Washington, D.C. and expanded them
under the aegis of a new periodical, The Banner of the Constitution. It was ampler in scope than
its predecessor: it was designed to supply more numerous and varied facts in support of true
theories. But the overarching principles were the same: individuals were held to be better
stewards of their interests than governments, exchange was mutually beneficial, and, notably, it
was “an error to suppose … that the interests of a country are to be promoted by counter
restrictions.”120
Because Raguet took credit for the reciprocity treaty with Brazil signed lately by his
successor (“I cannot but think that the treaty … was the fruits of the course I pursued”121), he
undoubtedly had in some exceptions to the erroneousness of counter restrictions. Sorting the
valid exceptions from invalid ones in light of free-trade doctrine would require his constant
attention. Tariff reform was high on the agenda of the 21st Congress, but no realistic reform
would be a pure free-trade measure. He would have to decide what kind of reform was adequate
to gain his endorsement.
Among the several reform bills introduced, Raguet’s opinions on two of them, both
founded upon reciprocity, are especially significant. The first was unveiled in February of 1830

44
by Congressman Cambreleng of New York City, chairman of the House Committee on
Commerce. Cambreleng issued a lengthy report detailing the state of American trade and
navigation and supporting new legislation. His chief concern was trade between the United
States and Great Britain, which was “embarrassed with restrictions.” Most of the restrictions, he
determined, were of the United States’ own making: while Great Britain had lately been
dismantling its prohibitions and substituting moderate duties, “we have been substituting
restrictions for free trade.” Among the more egregious were U.S. tariffs on woolens, cottons,
glassware, and rolled iron, which had risen in some cases (depending on the particular product)
to 168%, 125%, 70%, and 180%, respectively. Cambreleng’s proposal: to create a maximum
duty on all goods imported from any particular partner of 30% ad valorem, which duty would
apply whenever it was determined that the partner had done the same. The proposal would have
created, in effect, a two-column tariff for all goods whose tariffs stood above 30%. The low-tariff
column would have applied to countries remaining in the United States’ good graces from year
to year as well as those wishing to cement their “reciprocating commercial privileges” with a
treaty. Raguet reprinted Cambreleng’s entire 72-page report in serial form throughout six issues
of The Banner of the Constitution. He did not neglect to append his own editorial comments.122
Raguet’s comments were wholly and effusively positive. He judged Cambreleng to have
produced “the most able and masterly exposition of the practical operation of restrictive laws,
that has ever been submitted to Congress.” Whereas Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, and
Benjamin Franklin had exposited ably the principles at issue, he continued, Cambreleng had
demonstrated them with particulars. The congressman had not only maintained “in an
argumentative, sound, and logical manner, the grand essential theories of free trade” but had also
proved them “by the adducing of the most conclusive facts, collated in the form of tables.”123
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Later Raguet commented specifically on the report’s two-column tariff-reciprocity proposal,
when it was introduced as a bill for debate in the House. It was meant to appeal to the “moderate
portion of the tariff party,” he admitted, but that fact did not counsel against it. The moderates
advocated a restrictive policy only “upon the ground of retaliation,” which was legitimate. The
bill, which was designed upon the same ground, was “completely calculated to prepare the way
for that kind and friendly intercourse with foreign nations which all Christains [sic] and
philanthropists ought to desire.”124
The second bill eliciting Raguet’s opinions did not rank as high in his estimation. Senator
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri proposed similarly to reduce or abolish duties on imports of
numerous goods, and on the tonnage of ships, from countries offering equal favors to the United
States; and to levy a tariff of 33 and 1/3 percent on a smaller number of goods, namely furs and
raw hides, imported from countries that did not reciprocate the United States’ free admission of
them by giving “equivalent advantages.”125 In the case of the republics of South America, which
exported furs and hides and could not be expected to want similar goods from the United States,
the “equivalent advantages” would consist of tariff concessions for some other U.S. products. If
they did not offer concessions, “the penalty of their own election falls upon them.”126 Like
Cambreleng’s proposal, Benton’s required a determination of other countries’ reciprocal tariff
reductions in order to activate reductions in U.S. tariffs. Like Cambreleng’s, Benton’s would
therefore create a two-column tariff, the high-tariff column being framed as a set of
countervailing duties. The difference was that, for two goods of particular interest to Western
states, instead of a partner’s reciprocal treatment resulting in U.S. duties being lowered to 30%,
the partner’s non-reciprocal treatment would result in U.S. duties being raised to just over 30%.
To Raguet, the difference mattered. Although Benton’s proposal was founded upon “a great deal
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of sound and orthodox reasoning,” the part concerning furs and hides did not “correspond with
the views maintained by this Journal.”127
In his next issue Raguet restated those views. It was common with advocates of high
duties, he began, “and even with some who strongly incline to the doctrine of free trade,” to
argue for restrictions of trade with countries that restricted trade with the United States. A simple
example would show the fallacy of the argument. “The proposition, we are to combat, asserts,
that if the Buenos Ayrean Government should lay a duty on flour, it would be good policy in our
Government to lay a corresponding duty on hides, that is, that we should be benefitted by such
countervailing duty.” If Buenos Aires imposed a duty on U.S. flour of 50%, or perhaps even
higher, then a Pennsylvania farmer would sell less flour there and could afford to buy fewer
hides. But he could still afford to buy some hides – say, half the original number. If the U.S.
government retaliated with a duty on Buenos Aires hides, then he could afford less than half. The
government’s action “would be precisely like that of a man, who, by way of retaliation upon
another for a supposed wrong, should fall to work and pull his hair out of his own head, as some
foolish children do.” Repeating his argument against Madison from the year before, Raguet
concluded that a countervailing duty was justifiable only if there was good reason to believe the
original offender could be “coerced into an abandonment of his error.” If not, then it would only
cause mischief. Anyway, “as a permanent system, it is always to be avoided.”128
The homily was directed unmistakably against Benton’s bill.129 The crux was that while
Cambreleng’s countervailing-duty proposal was a Christian and philanthropic boon, Benton’s
was a foolish bungle. The gap between the proposals was rather narrow for such widely different
assessments. But Raguet wished to promote the closest approximation to a free-trade bill that the
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politics of the moment would permit. In such circumstances a narrow gap could seem, or could
be made to seem, wide indeed.
As an exercise of Raguet’s growing influence, more important than his endorsement of
Cambreleng’s reform proposal was his spearheading, the next year, a massive convention of
free-traders from fifteen states ranging from Maine to Mississippi. Between 150 and 350
delegates, according to different accounts, convened at the Musical Fund Hall in Philadelphia
between September 30 and October 7, 1831. The call for participants was issued from Raguet’s
own house by a coterie of southern and northern free traders, the latter group including (in
addition to their host) Henry D. Sedgwick, his bother Theodore, and Clement C. Biddle, among
others.130 The convention, they declared, would “be the reverse of the Harrisburg Convention” of
1827. It would gather and disseminate information promoting tariff reform; specifically, it would
produce “a petition or memorial, to be addressed to the next Congress, for the purpose of
obtaining a modification or repeal of the existing Tariff.”131 In the event, Raguet was the
convention’s secretary.132
William S. Belko tells in detail the story of the Philadelphia Free Trade Convention.133
What remains to be said here concerns its implications for free-trade and protectionist doctrines
and their treatment of reciprocity. Two weeks before the convention, Raguet reiterated the views
that had led him to applaud the rumors of trade negotiations with Great Britain and to support
Cambreleng’s bill. To the question of whether the Constitution’s commerce clause (Article I,
Section 8, clause 3) permitted the levying of duties on tonnage and imports, at least for purposes
of retaliation, Raguet answered, “unhesitatingly, yes.” He also stated explicitly what he had
implied when applauding the rumored negotiations with Great Britain and Cambreleng’s bill:
contrary to his own argument against Madison, retaliatory duties could target not only a
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country’s shipping but also its goods. But the constitutionality of such duties depended crucially
on Congress’s purpose. Congress was permitted to “regulate” commerce, not to diminish it – so,
if the commerce clause were to authorize a tariff act, “the act must be instituted for no other
purpose than to secure a removal of the offensive provision.” According to Raguet, the Tariff of
1828 did not meet that requirement: “for, had this been the case, our laws would have been
special, not general: their provisions would have been specifically applied to particular nations,
regulating the duties with some reference to those against which they were retaliatory.”134 On the
eve of the Free Trade Convention, its chief organizer was arguing that the Tariff of 1828 was
unconstitutional because it was insufficiently discriminatory! The convention was badly needed
not only for its stated aims but also to help free traders to think through their position.
In fact, the free-trade men had various positions, especially on the constitutionality
question. The fact was manifest most dramatically on the sixth day, when the delegates debated
an “Address to the People of the United States” delivered by John Berrien of Georgia on behalf
of the convention’s General Committee. The address was calculated to bridge the differences
between the delegates from several states, especially but not only in the South, who disputed the
constitutionality of the tariff, and those mainly from New York and New Jersey who affirmed it.
After emphasizing the wrongs inflicted by the tariff system, the address observed that “a
numerous and respectable portion of the American people, do not merely complain that this
system is unjust, but they question the right to establish it.”135 Specifically, although they
admitted Congress’s power to levy duties and countervail foreign commercial regulations, and
thus to provide protection incidentally, they denied its power to do so for that purpose
principally. But it was conspicuously “they” to whom the complaint was attributed, not “we.” By
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airing the complaint respectfully without professing to agree with it, the General Committee
hoped to avoid any dispute among the body of delegates.
That hope was immediately dashed. Some delegates wished to inveigh against the tariff
only on the grounds of its inexpediency – or perhaps, as Theodore Sedgwick suggested, its
offensiveness to God – and omit any expression whatsoever of the unconstitutionality argument.
Others thought the argument was not expressed strongly enough: Judge Johnston of South
Carolina thought that under no circumstances should the legality of protection, even incidental,
be admitted to tariff advocates. “All they have contended for, is, that it is an incidental power,”
he said. “Shall we concede to them all they demand?”136
The address was approved by the majority of delegates, but not before the weaknesses of
the moderate form of the unconstitutionality argument, which happened to be the form Raguet’s
favored, were amply demonstrated. A dueling tariff convention held in New York from October
26 to November 1, including Carey, Niles and over 500 others, pounced on the weaknesses. In
their own address, protectionists mocked the free traders’ concessions. So a bunch of tariff
skeptics held protection to be unconstitutional but accepted Congress’s powers to give protection
incidentally and to countervail foreign legislation. “Are not these concessions,” goaded the tariff
advocates, “inconsistent with the main proposition?” Protectionist tariffs, they claimed, were
usually designed precisely to protect manufacturers from the unequal competition of other
countries. They were “no other than so many acts passed to countervail the injurious commercial
regulations of foreign states.”137 Given the claim, it followed that the unconstitutionality
argument spelled out in the Philadelphia address was not only wrong, it was irrelevant. As for the
practical wrongs of protectionist tariffs, which the protectionists now equated with
countervailing duties, the New York address called attention to the longstanding system of
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countervailing duties on tonnage embraced similarly by foreign countries and the United States.
The system was not especially controversial. Thus it would appear that “those who have taught
us their theory of free trade, are too wise to practise it.” The appearance held even where
countries reduced their duties reciprocally: far from acknowledging the benefits of free trade,
they were demonstrating that “trade can only be carried on between nations by mutual
agreement; and mutual protection leads to reciprocity as the only equitable arrangement.”138
Theodore Sedgwick, for one, saw the muddle that free traders had gotten themselves into.
To Henry Lee, who had partial responsibility for composing a memorial to Congress on behalf of
the Philadelphia convention, Sedgwick expressed doubt that free traders had expressed plainly
enough what “free trade” meant – or that they even knew what they meant. “This produces
confusion in the minds of the people,” he continued, “and gives our adversaries a great
advantage.” Sedgwick offered what he meant by the term: “equal duties and no preferences, no
protection.” And he offered correspondingly a suggestion for writing the memorial. “I hope my
dear Sir, that we shall no longer tamper with this subject – any half way will I think now be
considered, and ought to be, as mean & timid – it will do no good, it will be unintelligible to the
people.”139 Thus Theodore Sedgwick and Judge Johnstone, who opposed each other vehemently
on the unconstitutionality question, were of one mind on a more basic question. Compromises to
expediency were, in fact, inexpedient. Whether the compromise pertained to the legal, practical,
or moral argument for free trade, the same conclusion held. Acceptance of discriminating duties
in any industry, for any purpose, in any circumstances, undermined the free-trade cause.
As it turned out, the memorial was altered from its original design and divided into parts.
Former Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin, another of the convention’s leaders, composed the
“Memorial of a Committee Appointed by the Free Trade Convention” in close consultation with
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Raguet and some others. It was a document of 55 pages presenting already a fairly
comprehensive statement of the free traders’ case. Lee went further, writing an Exposition of
Evidence in Support of the Memorial to Congress that was more than three times longer. True to
their titles, the documents complemented each other. While both manifested a wish to hew
generally to Sedgwick’s advice, both departed from it in crucial particulars.140
“Equal duties” was indeed their plea. The memorialists called “for a uniform duty,”
whatever would be its rate, so that “all the sections of the country, classes of society, and
individuals” would maintain approximately the same relative positions they would have had with
no duties at all. The memorialists were not, however, indifferent as to the rate: they suggested 20
to 25 percent ad valorem in place of the current duty that amounted on average to perhaps 40
percent.141 If their suggestions had been offered without important qualifications and
accompanied by calls for (1) a domestic excise equal to the tariff, and (2) a ban on differential
treatment of imports from different countries, then, even with a tariff of 20 to 25 percent,
Sedgwick’s advice would have been followed to the letter. Equal duties, no protection, and no
preferences, without any “half way.”
But they added qualifications in every respect. Equality of duties, they admitted, need not
apply to items necessary for the national defense, nor to luxuries or raw materials. Import duties
that were not balanced by domestic excises were regrettable, but “the people prefer, in time of
peace, duties raised on the importation of foreign merchandise to any internal tax,” and they
would not quarrel with the people on that count. Finally, retaliatory laws and the differential
treatment they entailed were an evil – except when they were not! “Retaliatory measures may be
resorted to with more or less success, according to circumstances; and as they may be more or
less adapted to the object in view, for the purpose of inducing a nation to alter her policy or
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conduct.”142 If retaliation did have that object in view, then, elaborated Lee, it only “met taxation
by taxation – not to restrict and restrain trade, but to make it more free.”143 (“Most capital,”
Raguet commended Lee on the part of the Exposition containing that last point.144) These
arguments had already been tried and turned against their proponents. They could hardly be
relied upon to clear up the “confusion in the minds of the people” that Sedgwick apprehended
and, according to him, the likes of Carey and Niles exploited.
Gallatin’s memorial and Lee’s Exposition, which were together supposed to constitute a
decisive free-trade manifesto, did not put to rest Sedgwick’s apprehensions or the protectionists’
rebuttals. What did so at last was not persuasion but precipitation of a crisis. South Carolina’s
nullification of the tariff in November 1832 threatened disunion and disaster unless a
compromise was struck. Henry Clay introduced the compromise in the Senate on February 12,
1833. The free list was to be enlarged and all other duties were to be reduced, by stages, to a
maximum 20% ad valorem in 1842. After that year, duties were to be laid as necessary to raise
revenue for “an economical administration of government.” This was rather less a compromise
than an utter capitulation to the position staked out by Gallatin and Lee for the Philadelphia
conventioneers. Its cause, by Clay’s own account, was the prospect of an even worse outcome
for tariff advocates and the country if the controversy were allowed to linger.145
After the enactment of the Compromise Tariff on March 2, 1833, in nearly the form that
Clay first introduced it, protectionists and free traders alike were loath to disturb it. They had
retreated from the brink, and most did not wish to return anytime soon. The tariff controversy
quieted down.
The quiescence was not without its costs. In the midst of the nullification crisis, in
December, 1832, Raguet had discontinued The Banner of the Constitution to prepare the ground
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for an even more ambitious undertaking: a daily paper promoting the same principles.146 The
events of the following months made not only the bigger undertaking, but also the Banner itself,
unviable. Scaling back his plans, in August 1833 he established a bimonthly periodical, The
Examiner, and Journal of Political Economy, which was “devoted to the advancement of the
cause of state rights and free trade.” But the value of publishing even as frequently as that was
questionable. Raguet’s peculiar rationale was that, precisely because the rancor had subsided,
“men may now calmly sit down and reason together upon those vital questions of constitutional
law and public policy.”147 By the end of 1834 he acknowledged that the men so seated were too
few to sustain his paper.148 He kept it afloat until the next summer and finally sold it to the owner
and editor of the United States Telegraph, Duff Green, who held similar state-rights convictions
and, since late in Jackson’s first term, a similar animus against the President.149
The tariff question lay dormant through the Panic of 1837 and its immediate aftermath. It
reawakened around 1840, when the end of the initial nine-and-a-half year term of the
Compromise Tariff loomed two years ahead. In a debate of that year on public expenditures,
Senator Calhoun of South Carolina warned his colleagues that when the moment to adjust the
tariff arrived, he would “resist all attempts to draw more money from the pockets of the people
than is absolutely necessary, with rigid economy, to the just and constitutional wants of the
Government.” He would insist, in other words, that his colleagues continue to honor the
compromise. Although Clay professed his intention to do just that, his remarks to the effect that
he would nevertheless “meet prohibitions with prohibitions” aroused suspicion.150
The suspicions of free traders grew in 1841. Rep. Henry A. Wise of Virginia saw designs
afoot to reinstate protection, albeit under a different name that would not openly controvert the
Compromise Tariff. “Gentlemen will not violate the compromise,” he observed; “Oh no! they
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will not violate the compromise as they understand it; yet they can do all the mischief I dread
within the terms of their comprehension!”151 The comprehension at issue was that duties could
be raised ostensibly for purposes of retaliation. To do so was arguably consistent with the
“economical administration of government” because it would convince foreign countries to drop
their barriers to U.S. exports – and what could be more economical than that? An article
reproduced in Niles’ National Register presented the argument ably. The United States imported
from France double the value of goods that traveled in the opposite direction, while subjecting
French goods to one-third the duties. Duties on silks and linens, of which France was a leading
exporter, had been eliminated by the Compromise Tariff; they should be revised upward to the
maximum 20%. Duties on wine had been cut in half by the Tariff of 1832; they should be
restored. Such “reciprocative and retaliative duties” would be just; they would be consistent with
the compromise; they might cause the French government to change its ways; and if they did not,
then “we have the ability to produce ourselves” the same goods. To be sure, those statesmen
whose understandings of political economy were based on “fine spun theories” would not like
the proposal, but anyone who applied the test of “practical experience” would see its virtue. Not
as a protective measure, of course, but merely as a means of inducing foreigners “to extend to us
the same liberality we have ever manifested toward them.”152
The proposal was the core of the tariff law enacted in September 1841.153 Raguet, now
President of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce and ailing gravely from bronchitis,
responded as the author of the foregoing newspaper article expected a theoretician to do. He did
so despite the awkward fact that his own occasional argument for reciprocity was not so different
from the one that now piqued him.
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The response was his last published work. To compose it, he recycled his countervailingduties article, cited previously, from The Banner of the Constitution of March 6, 1830. There
were differences: instead of a 50% tariff, he now supposed that Buenos Aires imposed a 20%
tariff on U.S. flour, and he went on to apply his lesson particularly to the case of France. Instead
of likening the retaliating country to a child pulling out his own hair, it was now a man cutting of
his nose to spite his face. But the substantial difference lay in the exceptions that Raguet
admitted to “the impolicy of countervailing duties.” In 1830, he had admitted the desirability of
retaliation if there were “a reasonable probability that the original aggressor … can be coerced
into abandonment of his error.” A decade later, it was “too dangerous to be resorted to, without
something like a positive conviction that it will be successful.”154
The danger that Raguet referred to was the obvious one: an endless war of mutual
retaliation. There was another danger that he did not name but that he acknowledged,
intentionally or not, in this final adjustment of his doctrine. Allowances for reciprocity, as
Theodore Sedgwick and Judge Johnstone had warned, undermined the free-trade argument. They
cleared they way, perhaps, for achieving immediate and possibly important political objectives
and diplomatic triumphs. But they also fostered the argument and the legislation that Raguet
expended his last efforts in resisting.

CONCLUSION
A final element of Raguet’s last article is worthy of note. He reserved his severest scorn not for
the “impolicy” that was his main subject, but rather for his longstanding bête noire, the supposed
opposition of theory and practice. What ignoramuses and quacks, he scoffed, were those self-
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professed “practical men” who offered “with an air of triumph, as if they put an end to all doubt
on the subject, ‘one fact is worth a thousand theories’”!155
It is an irony of Raguet’s life, and of the early-to-mid-19th century tariff and trade
controversies, that he was so provocable by the theory-versus-fact trope. The long sweep of his
career, encompassing his words and deeds as state politician, diplomat, newspaper editor, and
executive, does not manifest any theoretical rigidity. Try as he did repeatedly to demonstrate that
there was no necessary discrepancy between theory and fact, his record demonstrates it better –
albeit in a way he would not have cared to admit. In Raguet’s hands, the free-trade doctrine of
the time was a malleable thing. In light of the problem of reciprocity, it admitted, often with
unintended consequences, continual adjustments to political and economic facts.
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